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Texte présenté et traduit par Lois OPPENHEIM 1
«  Pourquoi un colloque sur le Nouveau Roman ? Pourquoi en ce moment ? 
Et pourquoi à New York University ? » Ce sont là trois questions posées par Tom 
Bishop, Florence Lacaze Gould Professor of French Literature à NYU, lors du 
colloque «  Three Decades of the French New Novel  », organisé par Tom Bishop 
en 1982 et publié quatre ans plus tard sous le même titre par The University of 
Illinois Press. J’ai eu le plaisir d’éditer ce livre où les questions de Bishop introdui-
saient ses remarques préliminaires.
Plus de trois décennies de Nouveau Roman s’étaient écoulées avant cette ré-
trospective ; plus de trois décennies ont maintenant passé depuis la publica-
tion du livre. Et les réponses restent encore intéressantes de nos jours  : le Nouveau 
Roman a constitué une rupture radicale avec la tradition romanesque ; les 
quatre  romanciers français qui participaient au colloque venaient chacun de 
publier une œuvre de fiction, quatre romans très bien reçus par la presse ain-
si que par le grand public, à en juger par les ventes ; et le Centre de civilisation et 
culture française à NYU, dirigé à l’époque par Bishop, entretenait depuis un cer-
tain nombre d’années une relation étroite avec le Nouveau Roman. Professeurs et 
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étudiants s’intéressaient énormément à cette école littéraire qui n’en était pas 
une, et ces quatre Nouveaux Romanciers – Claude Simon, Alain Robbe-Grillet, 
Nathalie Sarraute, et Robert Pinget – venaient assez régulièrement enseigner et/ou 
intervenir à NYU.
Claude Simon, pour ne citer que lui, était considéré par Bishop comme un des 
plus grands écrivains de la littérature du xxe siècle (ce que le Prix Nobel décerné 
à Simon allait bientôt confirmer) et Bishop tenait beaucoup à ce qu’il prenne 
part au colloque. Dans un contexte où la participation des quatre romanciers 
témoignait d’un besoin de se défendre contre les accusations de motivation stra-
tégique, contre les accusations d’intentions théoriques qui feraient tabula rasa 
du réalisme balzacien, c’était en effet Simon qui allait le plus loin en niant tout 
pensée conjecturale sur le roman en général. Comme on le verra dans ce qui suit, 
la contribution de Simon, son texte et sa participation à la table ronde, affirment 
surtout l’importance de l’expérimentation et de la créativité pure et simple, plutôt 
qu’une critique de quelque institution littéraire. En effet, en récusant devant son 
auditoire tout point de départ théorique ou révolutionnaire à ses écrits, il s’est 
montré non seulement modeste et humble, mais extrêmement perspicace en ce 
qui concerne l’interrogation fondamentale propre à toute forme d’expression es-
thétique, extrêmement pénétrant en ce qui concerne la relation de ses écrits (et du 
Nouveau Roman en général) à notre modernité (car chaque période a la sienne, 
nous rappelle-t-il) et à l’historicité elle-même…
*
Before I begin, I would like to ask that you excuse me if the lecture which 
I  am going to give lacks a certain rigor and takes in a bit of everything. 
For reasons beyond my control (as they say), I learned that I would be al-
lowed to come here only twelve days before my departure. This left me very 
little time to try to set in some order the notes I had taken while thinking 
about this colloquium and to compose in haste a text which would have pro-
fited from being more concentrated. But this was not my fault.
And, as a preamble, I must warn those who have come to listen to me 
that they are facing a simple, self-taught writer whose knowledge of litera-
ture does not surpass the level of amateurism. The majority of you, whether 
professors, essayists, or students, certainly know much more than I about the 
novel, theater, or poetry, as well as literary theory, semiology, or linguistics, 
with regard to which I often wonder, moreover, whether, contrary to what 
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Barthes believed, this was not a poisoned gift that Roman Jakobson granted to 
literature, as were, in other respects, sociology and psychoanalysis by others.
But, after all, perhaps art is doomed to sail periodically among the dread-
ful reefs of scientism. For example, at the end of the last century, a painter 
whose name would otherwise have been long forgotten, Paul Serusier, elabo-
rated a “théorie des complémentaires”, as seductive as it was inoperative in 
practice. And, over these last few years, we have seen writers wear themselves 
out building, carefully, so as not to be outdone, texts which rest comple-
tely on some dreary series of anagrammatical acrobatics more or less inspired 
either by Saussure or a famous guru of psychoanalysis. It is not that I want 
to throw out the baby with the bath water but that, just as Lenin revealed a 
“maladie infantile” [an infantile disease] of communism (which still seems to 
perpetuate itself ), there exists a chronic disease of art and literature —and 
I do not know whether it is infantile or senile— which scientists of all per-
suasions devote themselves with constancy not to curing, but to aggravating.
As far as I am concerned, my cultural experience (if I may use this expres-
sion) is that of a dilettante. When I was young, I was made to study mathe-
matics (which, alas, I have long forgotten!) and I do not even have my degree 
in philosophy. The little that I know was acquired by reading, traveling, visi-
ting museums, and attending concerts, always in a rather disconnected way, 
without ever determining to study a subject in depth and obeying only the 
rules of pleasure. For example, it took my being a prisoner (and I think that 
one of the more fortunate aspects of my existence is that I lived the first part 
of it in a rather troubled Europe which enabled me —as, by force of circums-
tances, I was involved in certain events— to learn, I believe, something other 
than can be found in books). It took being a prisoner for me to read Kant 
and Spinoza, not because I chose to, but because that was what fell into my 
hands. The experience I had at that time, moreover, was instructive in two 
ways: first, I discovered that, in a space surrounded by barbed wire where it was 
strictly prohibited to own whatever was not absolutely necessary for the most 
primitive survival, it was possible to find almost everything, from women’s gar-
ters to Capital, including obscene postcards and the Acts of the Apostles. Second, 
that if Kant and Spinoza were not at all practically or morally useful to a 
starving man (they did not in any way help me to accept my misery), those 
books offered, nevertheless, even to the layman in philosophy that I am, this 
possibility for a gratuitous —and by this very gratuitousness, irreplaceable— 
excitement which is provided, as by music or painting, by reading.
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So this was my education or, if you prefer, my cultural “baggage”, consti-
tuted mainly of deficits and contained in this kind of sieve which is my 
mind, a mind retaining here and there only scraps of knowledge, at least 
consciously, for, after all, it is possible that Kant and Spinoza, swallowed, like 
mathematics, almost forcibly (and I do not have a very clear remembrance of 
them either), did contribute without my awareness to shaping it, as did (at 
least negatively) all the books which I have never wanted to reopen: for exa-
mple, La Princesse de Clèves, Les Liaisons dangereuses, Lucien Leuwen, as well as 
those I could never finish because they were too boring, whether La Cousine 
Bette or L’Éducation sentimentale. I must confess, most nineteenth-century 
French novels and their twentieth-century epigones, with their characters 
of a too foreseeable, too rational fate (as opposed, for example, to those of 
Dostoevsky), remind me of those bulls so appreciated by matadors called, in 
the slang of the corridas, “ferrocarils”, which means “set on rails” because they 
rush straight, and without warning, for the lure. (By the way, and since I have 
just mentioned Dostoevsky, I must say how surprised I am that each time I 
hear people speaking of the so-called traditional novel, they refer inevitably 
to Balzac, Stendhal, or Zola, forgetting, as though he had not existed, one 
of the three or four greatest writers in the history of literature and to whom, 
precisely, we owe fiction which is the contrary of those univocal novels so 
abundantly produced by the French nineteenth century and which give of 
the world this far from reassuring —and even eminently frightening— image 
mentioned yesterday by Robbe-Grillet).
To come back to myself, if I am asked the famous question “Why do you 
write?”, I must confess to my great shame that I have never had, like some 
others, even the least ambitious motivations: it has never occurred to me 
(and I have never wondered about it) that I should write to fight against the 
established order or to criticize it. If I have written (and still write), it is very 
prosaically, and maybe very selfishly, because I was impelled (as everyone is 
in his field, I think) by a certain need of “doing”. If I am asked why I “have 
done” in literature rather than anywhere else, and if I want to be sincere, 
I will answer “because I wasn’t capable of anything else”.
When I was young, I was rather lazy and, at the same time, like all young 
people, rather romantic (which, after careful thought, may be a form of 
laziness). I was led by these two shortcomings to throwing myself into va-
rious experiences like painting or, for a while, revolutionary action which my 
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incurable dilettantish mind rather quickly caused me to abandon and which, 
nevertheless, still causes me all kinds of problems each time I want to come 
to this country.
There remained the possibility of writing, which I thought to be easier 
than painting or revolution and, naturally, of writing what I believe required 
the least specialization or discipline: this kind of carry-all which is the novel, 
a genre whose rules (if there are any!) are not well defined and in which one 
thinks, at the beginning, that one can do and put down just about anything.
Unfortunately, I was not aware that here, too, I lacked the gift of serious-
ness which enables one to produce books likely to be of interest. Naively, I 
thought that in once again choosing (as I had for my readings) mere pleasure 
as a rule, this pleasure would be communicative and that I would be able 
to pass on a part of it to those reading my books. In spite of my various 
experiences as a revolutionary and as an amateur warrior (for war as I prac-
ticed it —in open country, on horseback, and armed with a saber, complete 
with musketoon, against planes and armored cars— though awfully deadly, 
it bordered on caricature), I did not yet know that the general public (of 
which every writer dreams) is tremendously “self-interested” (as we say of 
those game of cards or dice where money is involved). This is to say that the 
kind of pleasure, or rather of “profit”, that it expects from a novel is either 
that of an escape —where one forgets oneself for a few hours to identify with 
an exemplary hero or heroine comparable to some archetype (either good or 
evil)— or that of a teaching, of a bearing of knowledge which would propose 
a solution to the problems with which it is preoccupied —whether problems 
of social or love relations, the meaning of life or that of History, even without 
a capital letter— or, as, for example, in a detective story when the name of 
the murderer is revealed.
Given this, I soon had to resign myself to admitting that in this field, as 
well, I would never be a true professional. To tell the truth, as indicative of the 
profits my books have brought me over thirty years, I think that they must 
be more or less equal to those of an unemployed worker. Once more lacking 
the erudition and the skills which would have allowed me to earn my living 
by publishing articles or teaching in universities (but teaching what?), I am 
wondering how, if I had not been lucky enough to inherit a small fortune, 
I would have managed to provide myself with clothes, a place to live, or even 
very simply food, and to maintain myself in this marginal situation thanks to 
COMMENT SAVOIR ? 26
which I can, without conceding to any considerations of profit or opportunity, 
write and say whatever I think good.
By some miracle (or maybe by some misunderstanding), I was lucky, in 
spite of the limited circulation of my books, to find in my life a first, then 
a second, and finally a third publisher, one who happened to also be that of 
other writers whose books, except Samuel Beckett’s, I had never read and 
among whom, some, however, assured me (maybe once more by misunders-
tanding) that my work was moving in the same direction as theirs. That was 
extremely kind of them and flattering to me. Though, I must confess, not 
very clear to me when I became familiar with their works, except that for 
them, as for me, the time of a certain form, an even unbearable form, of novel 
seemed outdated and that, like me, they were trying to do “something else”.
Unlike my new friends, however (and as it could be detected in the very 
contradictory statements made by each of us at a meeting about ten years ago 
which united us all under the firm rule of a severe schoolmaster), I had never 
theoretically thought either about the problems which were posed, or about 
the way to solve them. I was proceeding by trial and error and, as a conse-
quence, I had the impression that I was like a kind of M. Jourdain to whom 
his grammar teacher explains that he is speaking prose without knowing it. 
For instance, I read in the papers 2 that in the course of another, more re-
cent colloquium, our friend Robbe-Grillet had drawn the conclusion that he 
and Nathalie Sarraute were the spiritual inheritors of Jean-Paul Sartre, that 
which he confirmed yesterday evening to the approval, moreover, of Michel 
Rybalka. Of course, I do not know the laws of genetics, but I must again 
confess that, despite careful self-examination, I discern nothing in myself 
which would allow me to claim this strange paternity —unless, in this matter 
as well, I am still like M. Jourdain.
Because as far as I am concerned, whether it be thirty years ago or now, 
I was working, and am still working, in a completely empirical way, taking 
from the start what suited me and rejecting what did not suit me in one 
or another of the writers whom I liked to read, like Dostoevsky, Conrad 
(and, by the way, I am surprised that his amazing preface to The Nigger of the 
Narcissus seems to have been forgotten), Joyce, Proust, and Faulkner. I was 
moving (and am still moving) forward rather gropingly, without ever knowing 
when I start a text what it will turn out to be (in the last analysis, it is always 
2.  Le Monde, January 22, 1982.
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very different from the original project which is so deeply modified in the 
process that generally very little remains of it), and I know even less what the 
text “should be” in order to obey certain canons.
Finally, I must add that I am somewhat afraid that it is once more because 
of a misunderstanding that I am here today, somewhat embarrassed and dis-
turbed at having crossed the entire Atlantic Ocean to, ultimately, perhaps di-
sappoint those who have invited me, for I have little more to formulate than a 
few amateurish reflections made after the fact about my works, accompanied 
by a few very unimaginative remarks.
What this means is that I feel at ease to request of those listening to me 
that they do not in any way consider the remainder of my talk as a magisterial 
lesson on the novel, and that I will gratefully welcome objections and perhaps 
even observations revealing my errors. That would be for me an opportunity 
to learn and enrich myself. In advance, therefore, I thank you.
And as I have just spoken of misunderstandings, perhaps it would be 
best to start with those revealed by certain questions asked of me either du-
ring interviews or privately a little more than a year ago when my last no-
vel, Les Géorgiques, was published. These show rather well how most readers 
continue, still today, to conceive of and receive the novel, fiction, and, more 
generally, literary texts.
Two things in particular struck me: First, that many of my interlocu-
tors insisted on the fact that the characters of that novel had, they claimed, 
“existed”, that they were “real” characters (some critics even believed that 
they could identify them). Second (and this was said with no malevolent in-
tention), that there were (still in that novel) phenomena of “fragmentation” 
and “discontinuity”, phenomena which, according to some, would be charac-
teristic of “modernity” in the sense that (to quote word for word one of my 
interviewers) “l’écriture y contrecarre sans cesse la poussée narrative” [The wri-
ting unceasingly works against the narrative thrust]. This thinking is typical, 
I believe, of a kind of uncertainty, and even bewilderment, the result of the 
conflict between, on the one hand, old reading habits and, on the other, 
certain maximalist theories which, more or less harebrained and smelling of 
terrorism, were made fashionable over these last few years.
To this kind of observation, I am instinctively tempted to reply: “narra-
tion” of what? “fragmentation and discontinuity” of what?
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I will not launch into a critical analysis here of the “realistic” novel such as 
it was throughout the nineteenth century in France and such as it continues 
to be today in serving for many as a model. But, in a few words, what strikes 
me in this kind of novel (and probably what bores me so) is less that “non-
conformist” hero’s expulsion from the established order that Robbe-Grillet 
spoke about yesterday than its pedagogical and documentary pretensions. 
And what strikes me as well is that, following in the wake of the fable, the 
parable, the philosophical tale, and conceived as a demonstration of some 
moralizing thesis, whether in the social or psychic domain (“un enseignement 
social” [a social teaching], Balzac used to say), this kind of novel displays pre-
cisely all the characteristics of fragmentation and discontinuity.
Contrary to its pretension of describing the “real”, it is obvious that, unable 
materially to say everything, the realistic novel is limited to showing the suc-
cessive fragments of the story whose discontinuity is masked from the reader’s 
eyes only by the author’s assurance that he is relating only the “essential”. 
Others have maliciously stressed all that was arbitrary and questionable in 
this notion of “essential”. Others, as well, indicating on two parallel ordinates 
so-called referential time (that of the clock) and so-called literal time (that 
of the text), have easily shown how, in the latter, the former is subjugated to 
constant processes of dilation (when the text lingers over one event or one 
description), alternating with overwhelming compressions (when the text 
skims over, merely mentioning them, events considered “minor”). The text is 
even sometimes nullified (when the author decides, as he sometimes writes, 
that for one hour, one day, or several, nothing “important” has happened) or 
even inverted, through the process of looking back, of flashbacks re-counting 
what, to use the expression, happened elsewhere “in the meanwhile”.
The principle which governs the composition of this sort of novel, where 
the author hides behind a false objectivity (hence the most biting condem-
nation of realism which is this phrase of Baudelaire: “La nature comme si je 
n’étais pas là pour la dire” [Nature as if I were not there to tell it]), the prin-
ciple which governs the succession of events recounted in the text is that of 
causality, a linking of causes and effects leading the characters and the reader 
to that famous denouement considered by Emile Faguet as the “couronne-
ment logique” [logical culmination] of the novel, with the characters, there-
fore, being narrowly determined. Thus another critic, Henri Martineau, could 
claim that when he started writing Le Rouge et le Noir [The Red and the Black], 
Stendhal already knew how Julien Sorel was “to end up”, which, by the way, 
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is true since we know that Stendhal wrote this novel (as Flaubert did Madame 
Bovary) from a news item read in a local paper. This also demonstrates that 
this kind of novel has the status of a fable: it is not because a wolf devours 
a lamb that “la raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure” [the reason of the 
strongest is always the best] but, on the contrary, it is to demonstrate this 
axiom that the fabulist shaped a little fiction ending with an allegorical wolf 
devouring a no less allegorical lamb. In the same way, to justify the revolver 
shot fired by Julien Sorel at Madame de Rênal or Emma’s arsenic suicide, 
Stendhal and Flaubert had first to fill hundreds of pages with psychosociolo-
gical explanations of what led their hero and heroine to these acts.
Fortunately (and we must hasten to say it), between these intentions 
more or less flaunted by these authors and what they really gave us to read, 
there exists, for the salvation of literature, something more which in no way 
competes with these laborious “teachings” and in which resides, precisely, 
their respective geniuses, even if they would have perhaps considered this 
something to be “inessential”. (And I say “perhaps”, for when reading the 
numerous “scenarios” written by Flaubert in planning for Madame Bovary, 
it appears that they are precisely and essentially composed of notations of 
fragrances, colors, sounds, and sensations of any kind. So much so that one 
is led to wonder if, eighty years prior to a claim put forth by Tynianov, and 
despite the famous caricature showing him brandishing at the tip of a scalpel 
Emma’s bleeding heart, Flaubert did not consider his fable to be mainly the 
pretext for an accumulation of descriptions.)
To come to “modernity” (or rather to our modernity, for each period has 
its own, and there is no great writer, no great painter, no great musician who 
is not an innovator), which unquestionably marks an important break (un-
doubtedly one of the most spectacular since Giotto’s break with Byzantine 
hieratism), it dates, in my opinion, from the end of the last century and the 
beginning of the one in which we live.
I know that it is always perilous to venture comparisons and parallels 
between different arts, and I am no more a specialist in the history of pain-
ting than in literature, but it appears to me, though I may be wrong, that the 
decisive break was initiated not by writers but by painters who overtly (and 
I say “overtly” because the “subject” in painting had long been no more than 
an alibi) called into question the principle (or rather the dogma) of realism 
and proclaimed that their work aimed at rendering images no longer of the 
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“real” world, but only (that which is entirely different) of the impressions they 
received from it. In other words, from then on, the concern was no longer 
with “la nature comme si je n’étais pas là pour la dire” [nature as though I 
were not there to relate it], but with the world as seen through me, this par-
tial, distorted, and personal vision that I have of it.
It was on this horizon that Cézanne appeared. It was he who challenged 
the word “impression”, preferring that of “sensation”. “We know, Jakobson 
said, but we do not see.” And it was in seeking to rid himself of this ready-
made knowledge that comes between our true sensation and our mind that 
Cézanne managed, at the very least, to completely modify painting.
To explain myself, I will say that in Cézanne’s contribution, I am par-
ticularly struck by two things. On the one hand, he left behind apparently 
unfinished paintings (I say “apparently” because the question of the “finish” 
of a work, whether it be painted or written, is, in itself, an entire problem 
deserving reflection). Cézanne left us apparently unfinished paintings where 
only the “strong points” of the motif are accounted for, which is to say that 
here and there, on the virgin and neutral surface of the canvas, there exist 
only a few lines and a few spots between which the spectator’s eye is invited 
to grasp “connections” by confronting them without passing through any 
intermediary filler.
On the other hand, always careful to grasp his feelings with precision, he 
noticed that “les plans se chevauchent” [the planes overlap] and even, as he was 
to say to Joachim Gasquet, that “les objets se pénètrent entre eux” [objects pene-
trate each other], that which is characteristic, if we think about it, of our way 
of perceiving the visible world, with a kind of imprecision or indistinction, 
and our perception of the entire world (shapes, colors, smells, sounds, and so 
on) as well —as much in the present as in our memory where, unceasingly, 
memories, images, and emotions veer into one another, superimpose on, as-
sociate with, and interpenetrate one another.
And it is from there (which is to say where we really apprehend things 
only by discontinuous fragments that overlap and combine to form, on the 
other hand, an emotive or sensorial continuity in our minds) that the Cubists 
were led, in a first step, to practice what was called “analytic Cubism”. This, 
following Cézanne’s example, arranged on a neutral background a few lines 
(horizontal or oblique) and a few spots —or rather a few modulations. In a 
second step, in 1913, came “synthetic Cubism”, which, without any solution 
then of continuity, and with no other principle than their qualitative affini-
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ties (shapes, colors, rhythms), had fragments of objects, imagined or even 
sometimes “real”, like sheets of newspaper, pieces of tapestry, of “faux-bois”, 
and so on, agglutinate, interfere, and intermingle with each other in the way 
that we really perceive them. Then later, after the collages and sculptures of 
Picasso, artists like Kurt Schwitters, Louise Nevelson, or Robert Rauschen-
berg conceived vast compositions or assemblages executed with the help of 
various materials: boards, tarred paper, debris from pieces of furniture or ma-
chines, the pouring of raw paint, and so on. To the extent that, if the word 
were not so devaluated today, one could call it a true realism in the dual sense 
that from a meditation on the at once both chaotic and very coherent nature 
of our perception and our memory, objects are thereby effected which seek 
their reality only within themselves.
If I had to sum up with an incisive and necessarily simplifying formula 
the change which thus occurred, I would venture that over the principle of 
the establishment of relations justified by causality and necessitating a kind of 
totalizing (and illusory as well) inventory, the principle of the establishment 
of above all qualitative relations took precedence.
If I have insisted on this date 1913 in a way which some might find a 
bit pedantic, it is that, at the same moment, Proust and (though to a lesser 
extent) Joyce (for Ulysses was still considered to be full of more or less esoteric 
significations) undertook to construct texts in which considerations of qua-
lity would have priority over the, succession or, if you prefer, the confronta-
tion of the elements.
That the streams of cause and effect linking the different episodes of a 
story intended to show the excellence of some moral or of some thesis could 
seem as arbitrary and questionable as that which, in this new perspective, 
associates two events of a text with no demonstrative pretension seems to be 
to me irrefutable. I may still think, despite what Balzac wanted to have me 
believe, that Cesar Birotteau could just as well, despite his honesty, have ne-
ver again risen from his ruin. I may still think that it is because of a series of 
very strange coincidences that Fabrice del Dongo commits the murder which 
causes him so many troubles and reveals to us the mechanisms and intrigues 
of power. I may remain skeptical (if not amazed) when I read in Faulkner’s 
plan for a preface to The Sound and the Fury that
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Si on avait envoyé les enfants passer l’après-midi dans le pré pour qu’ils ne restent pas à la mai-
son […] c’était afin que les trois frères et les petits noirs puissent lever les yeux vers le fond souillé 
de la culotte de Caddy grimpée dans l’arbre.
[If the children were sent off to spend the afternoon in the meadow so that they would not 
remain at home […] it was in order that the three brothers and the little blacks could have 
a look at the soiled panties of Caddy perched in the tree 3.]
On the other hand, however, I cannot question the fact that the unevenness 
of a cobblestone associates the courtyard of the Guermantes Hotel with 
two paving-stones of Saint Marc’s Baptistry. I cannot question, so obvious it 
seems to me, that the juicy flavor of the fruit which she plans to buy at the 
market leads Molly Bloom to an erotic daydream. Neither can I question 
that the word “Caddy” shouted by the golf players makes Benjy shriek with 
pain. It  appears to me that, on this basis, on this principle, Proust, Joyce, 
and Faulkner built constructions of which the solidity, the reliability, and the 
continuity seem much more determinative, if we want to use this word, than 
the chance meeting of two characters or of two animals in a fable. These other 
meetings, while they are dictated by associations of impressions or images, are 
also (like the strokes of the Impressionists) inseparable from the material (which 
is to say the language that, as has rightly been said, “parle avant nous” [speaks 
before us]), speaks by what is called its “figures”, its tropes (metaphors, meto-
nyms), and by its very dynamics (sometimes only phonetic effects), which itself 
provokes rapprochements, associations, and transports. (Must we be reminded 
that the word µεταφορά is, in Greece, written on trucks?)
It seems that there exist two excesses (or, if you prefer, two maximalisms, 
two terrorisms) whose effects are equally negative. In the same way that 
Valéry used to say that the world was threatened by two dangers, order and 
disorder, language could be said to be threatened by two dangers as well: on 
the one hand, that of being considered only as a vehicle of meaning and, on 
the other hand, that of being considered only as a structure, for it is always 
simultaneously both. It is really in these two potentialities and their perpetual 
interference that there appears to dwell this wonderful ambiguity which pro-
vides language with so many tremendous powers.
To those, therefore, who claim to bend it only to the requirements of 
expression and representation, we can answer with Lacan (and also already 
with Proust: let us not forget that the last part of Du Côté de chez Swann 
3.  W. Faulkner, Œuvres romanesques, éd. Michel Grenet, Gallimard, coll. “La Pléiade”, vol. 1, n.d., n.p. 
Translators’ note : this quotation was retranslated into English by us.
CONFÉRENCE 33
[Swann’s Way] is entitled Noms de pays : le nom [Place-Names: The Name]) that 
the word is not only a “sign”, but “a network of significations”. As I wrote in 
my preface to Orion Aveugle, a “carrefour de sens” [a crossroad of meanings], 
which is to say that, like the elements of the Cubist painting or “assemblages”, 
the word is, in itself, a reality. While the word, of course, evokes the image 
or the concept of the object which it designates, it simultaneously calls up 
numerous other concepts, other images —those of objects sometimes very far 
away in the time of clocks and the measurable space of the “real” object and 
with which it is soon linked— to the extent that, at the moment of writing, 
a multitude of propositions are provided. Taken into consideration, these 
propositions will considerably distort the author’s first intention to the point 
where we can say that he who works language is at the same time worked by 
it, that which naturally implies a deflection in the meaning which is therefore 
not “expressed” but, in accordance with the accepted terminology, produced.
As for the hard and fast terrorists of the other side who fearfully resist 
any notion of meaning or of “referent”, their declarations always remind me 
of this little apologue of an art critic who remarked that when the Impres-
sionists were first starting, when they were not yet established and when the 
public was seeing in their painting only “barbouillages informes” [shapeless 
daubs], their, at that time, rare defenders would say to people (in front of 
Monet’s Nymphéas [Water Lilies], for example): “Stand back, stand back, and 
you will see that it depicts something!” A few years ago, at the time when 
the Tachists were fashionable, their defenders, seeking to justify them by fin-
ding respectable ancestors for them, would bring people before these same 
Nymphéas saying, “Come closer, come closer, and you will see that it does not 
depict anything!”
I was asked to speak specifically here of my last novel, Les Géorgiques, and 
I have but a little time left, though in fact I have really done nothing else 
for more than a half an hour now. It is naive to believe that, as I heard an 
essayist say, one whom I nevertheless esteem (this took place at a colloquium 
on Proust organized by New York University at the École normale supérieure 
in Paris), by who knows what perversity, a novelist fragments a totality to 
reassemble its pieces according to his fancy. As I have already said, this kind 
of suspicion would be accurately based only on an examining of the methods 
used by the so-called realistic novelists.
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As with each plan I have had for a novel, that of Les Géorgiques was, at the 
beginning, very vague. I am, as I have also already said, neither a philosopher 
(“Heureusement pour vous !” [Fortunately for you!], Merleau-Ponty once said 
to me, “Si vous l’étiez, vous seriez bien incapable d’écrire vos romans! ” [If you 
were, you would certainly be incapable of writing your novels !]), a moralist, 
or a believer. That is why I have nothing special to reveal about the great 
questions which are posed by mankind, like sex, the meaning of History, of 
life, evil or good. Naturally, like everyone else, and because I have in my life 
been involved in some rather tumultuous events, I have, of course, a few ideas 
concerning these things, but, in fact, they are too vague and sometimes too 
contradictory for me to consider them worth publishing.
The question which I had to answer was not “What have I to say”, but 
rather “What could I do” with a slew of old papers left by one of my ancestors 
who had been a member of the Convention, and then a general during the 
French Revolution and during the First Empire. And here we come to the ques-
tion of the “referent” which, apropos of me, seemed so disturbing to my friend 
Robbe-Grillet at the Cerisy colloquium. As I am no more a historian than a 
philosopher, I have no ambition to write the life of this character by going to 
various ministries and searching through official archives for documents which 
would have allowed me to complete my information. Despite the abundance of 
papers which had come into my possession (letters, memoirs, travel accounts, 
drafts of speeches, and numerous military orders), huge gaps or, if you prefer, 
huge “black holes” were left in the history of that life.
Moreover, in spite of these holes, the mass of images which was conjured 
up in me by these documents was sufficient enough to constitute a stimulant. 
This made me want, without searching further, to do “something” with them, 
and with others, other images of war, other images of revolution, which I was 
preserving from my personal experience.
For, while there was actually a discontinuity in the fragments of infor-
mation which I possessed, as there is in all those which we receive from the 
world surrounding us at every moment, I also perceived an extraordinary the-
matic continuity. (Thematics is nowadays condemned by a certain university 
fashion, but this does not matter…) Thus I found a disturbing relationship, 
one so close that at moments time seemed abolished, between events which 
had taken place some hundred years earlier and those which I had witnessed 
in Barcelona in  1936 or in Belgium in  1940, or even the account which 
George Orwell rendered of his experience in Spain, an account which is in 
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itself a perfect model, from its very first page, of an account by more or less 
voluntary omissions, and thus itself an account full of holes.
What I tried to do, therefore, was gather all this scattered material into 
a composition which would owe its coherence to those principles of quality 
which I mentioned earlier, by interweaving themes like those of a fugue, deve-
loping variations, and so on. I have related elsewhere how my work reminds me 
of the title of the first lesson of the study of Advanced Mathematics which is 
called “Arrangements, Permutations, Combinations”, and I cannot explain 
why I have the feeling that, just as there exist syntactic laws governing the 
organization and the coherence of a sentence into main, relative, and subor-
dinate clauses, there exists as well, though not codified, an internal logic of 
language which requires a syntax of the text in its entirety, from the first to 
the last line, and from which, if one manages to follow those hidden laws, 
“something” will tell itself for, were this not so, all discourse would be nothing 
but conventional chatter. “Il en va du langage comme des formules mathé-
matiques” [Language is comparable to mathematic formulas], Novalis wrote 
almost two centuries ago: “(membres de la nature) elles constituent un monde 
en soi, pour elles seules ; elles jouent entre elles exclusivement, n’expriment rien, 
si ce n’est leur propre nature merveilleuse, ce qui justement fait qu’elles sont si 
expressives, que justement en elles se reflète le jeu étrange des rapports entre les 
choses” [(members of nature) they constitute a world in itself, for them alone ; 
they play among themselves exclusively, express nothing but their own wonder-
ful nature, which is precisely the reason why they are so expressive, why preci-
sely the strange interplay of the relations between things is reflected in them].
And actually, from these discontinuous fragments of history, thus orga-
nized and interrelated in a way which I thought proper to forming a continuity, 
from this composition there emerges for me no “message”, no “moral”, no “fa-
tality” which, as has pompously been said, “introduirait la tragédie grecque dans 
le roman” [would introduce Greek tragedy into the novel]. Neither does there 
emerge any mockery: in a word, there is no kind of “teaching” beyond the single 
acknowledgment of these thematic or simply emotive “correspondences”.
Nothing, moreover, allowed me to arrange these events in a progression 
leading to a denouement which would have constituted what Faguet called 
a “couronnement logique” [logical culmination]. After having confronted all 
the dangers which a man can face during his lifetime, General L.S.M. dies 
very prosaically by his hearth, “O”, for his part, escapes only by chance from 
the agents of the Guépéou who have pitilessly hunted him down in Barcelona 
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like his companions of the P.O.U.M., and the General’s great-grandson gets 
away without a scratch from the slaughter to which the French generals had 
sent the calvary in 1940.
Need I point out that in speaking of these various characters I have just 
used the present tense? Must I emphasize after all that I have just said that 
they existed (that they were actually alive) only to the extent that the text 
was writing itself, and that they were continually modified by the addition, 
the suppression, or the moving of a paragraph or of a sentence? That, made 
of words and of the images which these words provoke (and of the referential 
gaps as well), L.S.M. is not, nor can he be, a portrait of General Lacombe Saint- 
Michel, just as “O” is not George Orwell (who, moreover, was himself not 
George Orwell since, in reality, he was named Eric Arthur Blair…). That the 
old lady is not my grandmother and that the General’s great-grandson, a cha-
racter of the novel just as the others are, also bears but a distant and limited 
connection with me ?
These characters, of course, borrow many of their features from people 
who “really” existed and in this way they may be differentiated from those 
characters, one may call them allegorical, usually found in works of fiction 
either in France or elsewhere, characters shaped out of nothing to suit the 
needs of the cause and intended, through their behavior and their adventures, 
to show what happens to the avaricious, the liar, the extravagant, the ambi-
tious, or other such conventional “personalities”.
Neither L.S.M.’s life nor his death prove anything at all and neither any 
kind of “moral” nor any kind of teaching is to be drawn from them —no 
more than from “O’s” adventures or from the acts of the other characters 
who appear in this novel. Moreover, too many unknowns remain, too many 
contradictions, too many doubts.
And it is perhaps this uncertainty which, beyond our differences and at 
times even our divergences, unites me with my friends in this movement of 
the “Nouveau Roman”, a movement which has given rise to a lot of misun-
derstandings, a lot of exaggerations, a lot of superficial commentaries, but in 
which, I believe, we are gathered by a common feeling that one can never be 
entirely sure of anything and that we are constantly treading on quicksand.
Thank you for your patience.
